

FOURTH EDITION

Life in Schools

An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Educational Research

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PART THREE

Critical Pedagogy

An Overview

Critical Pedagogy and the Egalitarian Dream

In the following section, you will be introduced to the tradition of critical educational theory, or *critical pedagogy*. My purpose in culling perspectives from a variety of critical theorists extends beyond providing an explanation for the harmful effects schooling has had on minority students and the poor. Rather, I urge you to connect these theoretical perspectives to the journal entries in Part Two, and more importantly, to your own experiences in the schools. I am asking *you* to mediate among the theory presented in the following sections, my journalistic documentation of my experiences as an inner-city teacher, and your own personal history that, if it is not already rich in teaching experiences, is most certainly rich in the experiences of being a student. This book can then provide a dialectical tension among theory, practice, and experience—a tension necessary for critical learning. I want to emphasize that I am distressed by the way I was produced as a public school educator, and that this book was written as a way of helping to unscroll the means whereby I have been able to re-form my pedagogy and politics through an engagement with critical theory and transformative praxis.

I want to make clear from the outset that my own elementary school teaching experiences are not offered as evidence that in some way “proves” the theories that follow. This book is not meant to be read either as an empirical study or as a devout acolyte’s conversion journal to the critical tradition. A concern with the validity and verifiability of theory is beyond the scope of this book; those wishing for empirical studies are encouraged to consult my book, *Schooling as a Ritual Performance*,¹ or the numerous other books within the critical educational tradition listed at the end of Part Three. I do hope that my journal accounts add some flesh and blood to what are essentially abstract theoretical formulations. But my decision to include the journal is more than a cry for texture. Rather, I hope to illustrate the contradictions embodied in the teaching process itself and to chart out the tension between the perspectives held by the beginning teacher, who is trying to find a larger purpose in the day-to-day *practice* of teaching, and the social theorist, who presumably has a better *theoretical*

grasp of what should be done and who is calling for practitioners to appropriate critical theory into their own work.

Why should you embrace the theories presented throughout these pages if they are not all clearly illustrated by my own teaching experiences? Conservative critics could easily offer my journal accounts as evidence that schools are in need of stricter discipline, more rules, regulations, and enforcement procedures, tougher standards for evaluating students and teachers, and a return to the basics. Liberal critics might argue for more funds and specialized programs. But all this is just the point. The literature on schooling abounds with both conservative and liberal perspectives.

In this book, you are given access to a *different kind* of analysis. Here I am using the term *difference* to refer to a *difference* that makes a difference. The challenge of critical pedagogy does not reside solely in the logical consistency, rhetorical persuasiveness, or the empirical verification of its theories; rather, it resides in the moral choice put before us as teachers and citizens, a choice that American philosopher John Dewey suggested is the distinction between education as a function of society and society as a function of education. We need to examine that choice: Do we want our schools to create a passive, risk-free citizenry, or a politicized citizenry capable of fighting for various forms of public life and informed by a concern for equality and social justice? Do we want to accommodate students to the existing capitalist division of labor by making them merely functional within it or do we want to make students uncomfortable in a society that exploits workers, that demonizes people of color, that abuses women, that privileges the rich, that commits acts of imperialist aggression against other countries, that colonizes the spirit and that wrings the national soul clean of a collective social consciousness? Or do we want to create spaces of freedom in our classrooms and invite students to become agents of transformation and hope? I trust that we do.

END NOTE

1. Peter McLaren, *Schooling as a Ritual Performance: Towards a Political Economy of Educational Symbols and Gestures* (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).

CHAPTER

4

The Emergence of Critical Pedagogy

In the context of that choice, a radical theory of education has emerged in the last twenty years. Broadly defined as “the new sociology of education” or a “critical theory of education,” critical pedagogy examines schools both in their historical context and as part of the existing social and political fabric that characterizes the class-driven dominant society. Critical pedagogy poses a variety of important counterlogics to the positivistic, ahistorical, and depoliticized analysis employed by both liberal and conservative critics of schooling—an analysis all too readily visible in the training programs in our colleges of education. Fundamentally concerned with the centrality of politics and power in our understanding of how schools work, critical theorists have produced work centering on a critique of the political economy of schooling, the state and education, the representation of texts, and the construction of student subjectivity.

Critical educational theory owes a profound debt to its European progenitors. A number of critical educational theorists continue to draw inspiration from the work of the Frankfurt School of critical theory, which had its beginnings before World War II in Germany’s Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research). The membership of this group, who wrote brilliant and ethically illuminating works of Freudo-Marxist analysis, included such figures as Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Leo Lowenthal, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse. During the war, a number of Institute members fled to the United States as a result of persecution by Nazis because they were Leftist and Jewish. After the war they reestablished the Institute in Frankfurt. Members of the second generation of critical theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas, have since moved from the Institute to carry on elsewhere the work initiated by the founding members. In the United States, the Frankfurt School of critical theory is currently making new inroads into social research and influencing numerous disciplines such as literary criticism, anthropology, sociology, and educational theory. Critical pedagogy also has distinctly U.S. roots, as well: such as the work of John Dewey and the social reconstructionists, all the way to educators such as Myles Horton of the Highlander School and the teachings of civil-rights activists including Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X.

Critical pedagogy has begun to provide a radical theory and analysis of schooling, while annexing new advances in social theory and developing new categories of inquiry and new methodologies. Critical pedagogy does not, however, constitute a

homogeneous set of ideas. It is more accurate to say that critical theorists are united in their *objectives*: to empower the powerless and transform existing social inequalities and injustices. The movement constitutes only a small minority within the academic community and public school teaching as a whole, but it presents a growing and challenging presence in both arenas.¹

Foundational Principles

Critical pedagogy resonates with the sensibility of the Hebrew symbol of *tikkun*, which means “to heal, repair, and transform the world, all the rest is commentary.” It provides historical, cultural, political, and ethical direction for those in education who still dare to hope. Irrevocably committed to the side of the oppressed, critical pedagogy is as revolutionary as the earlier views of the authors of the Declaration of Independence: Since history is fundamentally open to change, liberation is an authentic goal, and a radically different world can be brought into being.

Politics

A major task of critical pedagogy has been to disclose and challenge the role that schools play in our political and cultural life. Especially within the last decade, critical educational theorists have come to view schooling as a resolutely political and cultural enterprise. Recent advances in the sociology of knowledge, cultural and symbolic anthropology, cultural Marxism, and semiotics have led these theorists to see schools not only as instructional sites, but also as cultural arenas where a heterogeneity of ideological and social forms often collide in an unrelenting struggle for dominance. Within this context, critical theorists generally analyze schools in a twofold way: as sorting mechanisms in which select groups of students are favored on the basis of race, class, and gender; and as agencies for self and social empowerment.

Critical educational theorists argue that teachers must understand the role that schooling plays in joining knowledge and power to the value form of labor in capitalist society in order to use that role for the development of critical and active citizens with the courage to struggle for a new society outside the division of labor found within capital's social universe. The traditional view of classroom instruction and learning as a neutral process antiseptically removed from the concepts of power, politics, history, and context can no longer be credibly endorsed. In fact, critical researchers have given primacy to the social, the cultural, the political, and the economic, in order to better understand the workings of contemporary schooling.

Culture

Critical theorists see schooling as a form of *cultural politics*; schooling always represents an introduction to, preparation for, and legitimation of particular forms of social

life. It is always implicated in relations of power, social practices, and the favoring of forms of knowledge that support a specific vision of past, present, and future. In general, critical theorists maintain that schools have always functioned in ways that rationalize the knowledge industry into class-divided tiers; that reproduce inequality, racism, sexism, and homophobia; and that fragment democratic social relations through an emphasis on competitiveness and cultural ethnocentrism.

Although critical pedagogy is indebted to a wide variety of European intellectual traditions, it also draws upon a uniquely American tradition extending from the mainstream progressive movement of John Dewey, William H. Kilpatrick, and others, through the more radical efforts of the social reconstructionists of the 1920s such as George Counts and the work of Dwayne Huebner, Theodore Brameld, and James McDonald. In Roger Simon's terms, *pedagogy* must be distinguished from *teaching*.

"Pedagogy" [refers] to the integration in practice of particular curriculum content and design, classroom strategies and techniques, and evaluation, purpose, and methods. All of these aspects of educational practice come together in the realities of what happens in classrooms. Together they organize a view of how a teacher's work within an institutional context specifies a particular version of what knowledge is of most worth, what it means to know something, and how we might construct representations of ourselves, others, and our physical and social environment. In other words, talk about pedagogy is simultaneously talk about the details of what students and others might do together and the cultural politics such practices support. In this perspective, we cannot talk about teaching practices without talking about politics.²

Economics

Unfortunately, in their discussion of "critical thinking" the neoconservatives and liberals have neutralized the term *critical* by repeated and imprecise usage, removing its political and cultural dimensions and laundering its analytic potency to mean "thinking skills." In their terms, teaching is reduced to helping students acquire higher levels of cognitive skills. Little attention is paid to the purpose to which these skills are to be put. The moral vision that grounds such a view encourages students to succeed in the tough competitive world of existing social forms.

By defining academic success almost exclusively in terms of creating compliant, productive, and patriotic workers, the new conservative agenda for a "resurgent America" dodges any concern for nurturing critical and committed citizens. Instead, students are viewed as the prospective vanguard of America's economic revival. Critical educational theorists have responded to the New Right by arguing that the increasing adoption of management-type pedagogies and accountability schemes to meet the logic of market demands has resulted in policy proposals that actively promote the deskilling of teachers. This is most evident in the proliferation of state-mandated curricula claiming to be "teacher-proofed," which effectively reduce the role of the teacher to that of a semiskilled, low-paid clerk. The neoconservative agenda has, in effect, brought the advancement of democracy in our schools to a state of arrest. Neoconservatives reject the view that schools should be sites for social transformation and emancipation, places where students are educated not only to be

critical thinkers, but also to view the world as a place where their actions might make a difference.

Critical pedagogy is founded on the conviction that schooling for self and social empowerment is *ethically prior* to a mastery of technical skills, which are primarily tied to the logic of the marketplace (although it should be stressed that skill development certainly plays an important role). Concern over education's moral dimension has provoked critical scholars to undertake a socially critical reconstruction of what it means to "be schooled." They stress that any genuine pedagogical practice demands a commitment to social transformation in solidarity with subordinated and marginalized groups. This necessarily entails a preferential option for the poor and the elimination of those conditions that promote human suffering. Such theorists are critical of the emphasis that liberal democracy places on individualism and autonomy from the needs of others.

According to critical educational theorists, analyses of schooling undertaken by liberal and conservative critics necessarily favor the interests of the ruling class. The liberal perspective especially has been reappropriated by the very logic it purports to criticize. By contrast, the *critical* perspective allows us to scrutinize schooling more insistently in terms of race, class, power, and gender.

Americans traditionally have assumed that schools function as a mechanism for the development of democratic and egalitarian social order. Critical educational theorists argue otherwise; they suggest that schools do *not* provide opportunities in the broad Western humanist tradition for self and social empowerment and in fact often work against those opportunities. Critical pedagogy also challenges the assumption that schools function as major sites of social and economic mobility. Theorists like Paula Allman, Henry Giroux, Donaldo Macedo, Glenn Rikowski, Dave Hill, Mike Cole, and Richard Brosio argue that American schooling has defaulted on its promise of egalitarian reform and does not, in fact, provide opportunities for large numbers of students to become empowered as critical, active citizens. Rather, they argue, the economic returns from schooling are far greater for the capitalist class than for the working class.

In their attempts to explode the popular belief that schools are fundamentally democratic institutions, critical scholars have begun to unravel the ways in which school curricula, knowledge, and policy depend on the corporate marketplace and the fortunes of the economy. Their goal is to unmask the inequality of competing self-interests within the social order that prohibits equal opportunity from being realized. They warn against being deluded as educators into thinking that either conservatives or liberals occupy a truly progressive platform. In their view, no decisions can be made on the basis of transparent and disinterested standards of value, and no educational practices—whether they center on the issue of excellence, evaluation, or accountability—are ever innocent of the social, economic, and institutional contexts in which schooling takes place. Rather, they suggest that schooling must always be analyzed as a cultural and historical process, in which select groups are positioned within asymmetrical relations of power on the basis of specific race, class, and gender antagonisms. In other words, critical scholars refuse the task capitalism assigns them

as intellectuals, teachers, and social theorists, to passively service the existing ideological and institutional arrangements of the public schools. These scholars believe that the schools serve the interests of the wealthy and powerful, while simultaneously disconfirming the values and abilities of those students who are most disempowered in our society already: minorities, the poor, and the female. In short, educators within the critical tradition argue that mainstream schooling supports an inherently unjust bias, resulting not only in the transmission and reproduction of the dominant status quo culture, but more fundamentally in the reproduction of the division of labor and the interests of the ruling class.

Central to their attempt to reform public education is a rejection of the emphasis on scientific predictability and measurement that has been tacitly lodged in models of curriculum planning and in other theoretical approaches to educational practice. Critical theorists challenge the often uncontested relationship between school and society, unmasking mainstream pedagogy's claim that it purveys equal opportunity and provides access to egalitarian democracy and critical thinking. Critical scholars reject the claim that schooling constitutes an apolitical and value-neutral process. In fact, to argue that schools are meritocratic institutions is a conceptual tautology: Successful learners are those whom schools reward. If you happen to be successful, it must be because of your individual merit. Missing from this logic is a recognition that students from white, affluent backgrounds are privileged over other groups, not on the basis of merit but because of the advantage that comes with having money and increased social status. Critical pedagogy attempts to provide teachers and researchers with a better means of understanding the role that schools actually play within a race-, class-, and gender-divided society, and in this effort, theorists have generated categories or concepts for questioning student experiences, texts, teacher ideologies, and aspects of school policy that conservative and liberal analyses too often leave unexplored. In effect, critical pedagogy has sharply defined the political dimensions of schooling, arguing that schools operate mainly to reproduce the values and privileges of existing elites. Critical pedagogy commits itself to forms of learning and action undertaken in solidarity with subordinated and marginalized groups. In addition to questioning what is taken for granted about schooling, critical theorists are dedicated to the emancipatory imperatives of *self-empowerment* and *social transformation*.

Critical pedagogists would like to pry theory away from the academics and incorporate it in educational practice. They throw down the gauntlet to those conservative and corporate multiculturalists, who wish schools simply to teach students about America's great cultural heritage.³ They aim at providing teachers with critical categories, or concepts, that will enable them to analyze schools as places that produce and transmit those social practices that reflect the ideological and material imperatives of the ruling class.

Critical educators argue that we have responsibility not only for how we act individually in society, but also for the system in which we participate. Critical theorists put forward what might be labeled pedagogical surrealism: They attempt to make the strange familiar and the familiar strange. They set out to "relativize" schools as normalizing agencies—i.e., as agencies that essentially legitimate existing social relations

and practices, rendering them normal and natural—by dismantling and rearranging the artificial rules and codes that make up classroom reality. Unlike the liberal humanist who begins with the different and renders it comprehensible, the critical education theorist attacks the familiar, perturbing commonplace perspectives.⁴ Critical theorists attempt to go beyond the conventional question of *what* schooling means by raising instead the more important question of *how* schooling has come to mean what it has. The result is that schools—often seen as socializing agencies that help society produce intelligent, responsible, committed, and skilled citizens—turn out to be strange and disturbing institutions that not only *teach* subjects but also *produce* unreflective human subjects who, in their day-to-day activities, play out through the ideologies of the dominant culture and in so doing give ballast to the underlying set of socioeconomic relations bound to the rule of capital.

Critical educational theorists argue that Marxism has not been taken seriously in this country as a means of social-historical analysis; Marxist theorists and those who work within traditions of radical social thought indebted to Marxism often are subject to knee-jerk “marxophobia.” Though many if not most critical educational theorists work outside the orthodox Marxian tradition and do not consider capitalism an irrevocable evil, they do insist that its pattern of exploitation has produced an economic rationality that infuses current thinking on social and educational issues and continues to contribute to massive social problems such as racism, sexism, and classism. In order to ensure that all individuals have a voice in the surplus value their labor generates, critical educators argue that those responsible for our current brand of capitalism must be held morally accountable. A new class struggle is needed that will help guide and eventually reshape existing social relations of exploitation in the interests of *everyone*, one with the vision and power to counter the dehumanizing effects of modern supply-side capitalism. This can only be achieved with the overthrow of capitalist society itself in favor of a society in which the full development of the individual is the basis for the full development of society.

Critical educators question the very basis of school funding. Why, they ask, are schools funded on the basis of property taxes, which ensures that the children of the wealthy and privileged will inherit better schools in terms of resources, teacher salaries, clean buildings, etc.? Why don't state governments and the federal government assume responsibility for full educational funding? After all, the federal government assumes responsibility for operations such as Desert Storm. Critical educators oppose deregulation and opening school success to the logic of the marketplace, supposedly through the new “choice” schemes and voucher plans. Letting the market “equalize” education through vouchers will only exacerbate the disparity of chances between rich and poor students—inner-city schools will collapse. “Choice” means that the poor are “free” to become poorer while the rich are given the “choice” of becoming richer. Choice means Jim Crow education for the 1990s. Choice schemes need to improve the conditions of low-performing schools or else state funding will shrink due to declining enrollments, and students and teachers will transfer to other schools. In fact, some critical educators (and I include myself among them) challenge the very foundations of the global capitalist social order.

Theories of Interest and Experience

Critical educational theorists such as Henry Giroux argue that curriculum must be understood in terms of a *theory of interest* and a *theory of experience*. By theory of interest, Giroux means that curriculum reflects the interests that surround it: the particular visions of past and present that they represent, the social relations they affirm or discard. By theory of experience, Giroux means that curriculum is an historically constructed narrative that produces and organizes student experiences in the context of social forms, such as language usage, organization of knowledge into high- and low-status categories, and the affirmation of particular kinds of teaching strategies. Curriculum represents not only a configuration of particular interests and experiences, however; it also forms a battleground where different versions of authority, history, the present, and the future struggle to prevail. Critical theorists want to provide for educational theorists in general a public language that not only confirms the voices of teachers and of subordinate groups in the student population, but also links the purpose of schooling to a transformative vision of the future.

Beyond agreeing that schools reproduce inequality and injustice, contemporary critical theorists differ in many points of analysis. Recent work in the critical tradition can generally be divided into two categories: those that believe capitalism can be reformed in the interests of the working-class (most exponents of critical pedagogy) and those Marxist educators who believe that social justice can only be authentically achieved with the abolition of class society and the realization of a socialist alternative, such as Paula Allman, Glenn Rikowski, Dave Hill, Richard Brosio, Ramin Farahmandpur, myself, and others.

Critical pedagogy deals with numerous themes, many of which are situated in distinct fields of research and criticism. Some of these relatively new fields include feminist pedagogy, critical constructivism, and multicultural education. In addition, postmodern social theory has been taken up by some educational critics. Cultural studies is another area that in recent years has also generated a burgeoning interest among some critical educators. Transdisciplinary scholarship is growing among educational theorists and is likely to continue. The work of Lankshear and McLaren has drawn on interdisciplinary critical social theory to advance the analysis of literacy.⁵ Patti Lather's work combines postmodernist and feminist theory, but regrettably does little to contest capitalist social relations of exploitation.⁶ Critical literacy and media literacy are important new directions that are making serious inroads in school reform efforts, especially in urban areas. Disciplinary boundaries are beginning to blur, and in my estimation this makes for more innovative and important research within the critical tradition. More will be said about these fields throughout the volume.

There are many different strands to critical pedagogy: the libertarian, the radical, and the liberationist, all with points of difference and fusion. In addition to discussing the recent shifts toward a Marxist analysis in my own theoretical work, this book draws primarily on radical perspectives exemplified in the works of such theorists as Paulo Freire and Henry Giroux, who make an important distinction between *schooling* and *education*. The former is primarily a mode of social control; the latter has

the potential to transform society, with the learner functioning as an active subject committed to self and social transformation.

ENDNOTES

1. Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux, *Education Under Siege: The Conservative Liberal, and Radical Debate Over Schooling* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1985), 69–114. See for a review and critical analysis of this literature.
2. Roger Simon, "Empowerment as a Pedagogy of Possibility," *Language Arts* 64, 4 (1987, April): 370.
3. William J. Bennett, *What Works: Research about Teaching and Learning*. (Washington, DC: The United States Department of Education, 1986). Also, Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren, "Teacher Education and the Politics of Democratic Life: Beyond the Reagan Agenda in the Era of 'Good Times'," in C. C. Yeakey and G. S. Johnston (Eds.), *Schools as Conduits: Educational Policymaking during the Reagan Years* (New York: Praeger Press, in press).
4. James Clifford, "On Ethnographic Surrealism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, 4 (1981): 539–564.
5. Colin Lankshear and Peter McLaren (Eds.), *Critical Literacy* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993).
6. Patti Lather, *Getting Smart: Feminist Research and Pedagogy with/in the Postmodern* (New York and London: Routledge, 1991).

CHAPTER

5

Critical Pedagogy

A Look at the Major Concepts

In practice, critical pedagogy is as diverse as its many adherents, yet common themes and constructs run through many of their writings. I have talked about the general characteristics of critical pedagogy in the previous chapters. In the chapters that follow, I will outline in more detail the major categories within this tradition. A category is simply a concept, question, issue, hypothesis, or idea that is central to critical theory. These categories are intended to provide a theoretical framework within which you may reread my journal entries and perhaps better understand the theories generated by critical educational research. The categories are useful for the purposes of clarification and illustration, although some critical theorists will undoubtedly argue that additional concepts should have been included, or that some concepts have not been given the emphasis they deserve.

The Importance of Theory

Before we discuss individual categories, we need to examine how those categories are explored. Critical theorists begin with the premise that *men and women are essentially unfree and inhabit a world rife with contradictions and asymmetries of power and privilege*. The critical educator endorses theories that are, first and foremost, *dialectical*; that is, theories which recognize the problems of society as more than simply isolated events of individuals or deficiencies in the social structure. Rather, these problems are part of the *interactive context* between individual and society. The individual, a social actor, both creates and is created by the social universe of which he/she is a part. Neither the individual nor society is given priority in analysis; the two are inextricably interwoven, so that reference to one must by implication mean reference to the other. Dialectical theory attempts to tease out the histories and relations of accepted meanings and appearances, tracing interactions from the context to the part, from the system inward to the event. In this way, critical theory helps us focus *simultaneously on both sides of a social contradiction*.¹

Wilfred Carr and Stephen Kemmis describe dialectical thinking as follows:

Dialectical thinking involves searching out . . . contradictions (like the contradiction of the inadvertent oppression of less able students by a system which aspires to help all

students to attain their “full potential”), but it is not really as wooden or mechanical as the formula of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. On the contrary, it is an open and questioning form of thinking which demands reflection back and forth between elements like *part* and *whole*, *knowledge* and *action*, *process* and *product*, *subject* and *object*, *being* and *becoming*, *rhetoric* and *reality*, or *structure* and *function*. In the process, *contradictions* may be discovered (as, for example, in a political *structure* which aspires to give decision-making power to all, but actually *functions* to deprive some access to the information with which they could influence crucial decisions about their lives). As contradictions are revealed, new constructive thinking and new constructive action are required to transcend the contradictory state of affairs. The complementarity of the elements is dynamic: it is a kind of a tension, not a static confrontation between the two poles. In the dialectical approach, the elements are regarded as mutually constitutive, not separate and distinct. Contradiction can thus be distinguished from paradox: to speak of a contradiction is to imply that a new resolution can be achieved, while to speak of a paradox is to suggest that two incompatible ideas remain inertly opposed to one another.² [Italics original]

The dialectical nature of critical theory enables the educational researcher to see the school not simply as an arena of indoctrination or socialization or a site of instruction, but also as a cultural terrain that promotes student empowerment and self-transformation. My own research into parochial education, for instance, showed that the school functions *simultaneously* as a means of potentially empowering students around issues of social justice and as a means of sustaining, legitimizing, and reproducing dominant class interests directed at creating obedient, docile, and low-paid future workers.³

A dialectical understanding of schooling permits us to see schools as sites of *both* domination and liberation; this runs counter to the view of schooling which claims that schools simply reproduce class relations and passively indoctrinate students into becoming greedy young capitalists. They do reproduce class relationships but also can serve as a site where these class relationships can be contested. This dialectical understanding of schooling also brushes against the grain of mainstream educational theory, which conceives of schools as mainly providing students with the skills and attitudes necessary for becoming patriotic, industrious, and responsible citizens. It argues that schools do create patriotic, responsible citizens and that this is precisely the problem. As recent events have revealed, educated U.S. citizens have difficulty distinguishing among leaders who are bent on imperialist wars to secure “resources” for accumulating capital and those who are truly committed to peace and social justice.

Critical educators argue that any worthwhile theory of schooling *must be partisan*. That is, it must be fundamentally tied to a struggle for a qualitatively better life for all through the construction of a society based on nonexploitative relations and social justice. The critical educator doesn’t believe that there are two sides to every question, with both sides needing equal attention. For the critical educator, there are *many* sides to a problem, and often these sides are linked to certain class, race, and gender interests.

Let's turn for a moment to an example of critical theorizing as it is brought to bear on a fundamental teaching practice: writing classroom objectives. In this example, I will draw on Henry Giroux's important distinction between *micro* and *macro* objectives.⁴

The common use of behavioral objectives by teachers reflects a search for certainty and technical control of knowledge and behavior. Teachers often emphasize classroom management procedures, efficiency, and "how-to-do" techniques that ultimately ignore an important question: "Why is this knowledge being taught in the first place?" Giroux recasts classroom objectives into the categories of macro and micro.

Macro objectives are designed to enable students to make connections between the methods, content, and structure of a course and its significance within the larger social reality. This dialectical approach to classroom objectives allows students to acquire a broad frame of reference or worldview; in other words, it helps them acquire a political perspective. Students can then make the hidden curriculum explicit and develop a critical political consciousness.

Micro objectives represent the course content and are characterized by their narrowness of purpose and their content-bound path of inquiry. Giroux tells us that the importance of the relationship between macro and micro objectives arises out of *having students uncover the connections between course objectives and the norms, values, and structural relationships of the wider society*. For instance, the micro objectives of teaching about the Vietnam war might be to learn the dates of specific battles, the details of specific Congressional debates surrounding the war, and the reasons given by the White House for fighting the war. The micro objectives are concerned with the organization, classification, mastery, and manipulation of data. This is what Giroux calls *productive knowledge*. Macro objectives, on the other hand, center on the relationship between means and ends, between specific events and their wider social and political implications. A lesson on the Vietnam war or more recently the invasion of Grenada, the Desert Storm assault on Iraq, or the war in Afghanistan, for instance, might raise the following macro questions: What is the relationship between these invasions as rescue missions in the interests of U.S. citizens and the larger logic of imperialism? During the Vietnam era, what was the relationship between the American economy and the arms industry? Whose interests did the war serve best? Who benefited most from the war? What were the class relationships between those who fought and those who stayed home in the university? Other than replacing the corrupt Taliban regime and destroying terrorist compounds and networks in the war in Afghanistan, did the United States hope to secure vital resources such as oil?

Developing macro objectives fosters a dialectical mode of inquiry; the process constitutes a sociopolitical application of knowledge, what Giroux calls *directive knowledge*. Critical theorists seek a kind of knowledge that will help students recognize the *social function of particular forms of knowledge*. The purpose of dialectical educational theory, then, is to provide students with a model that permits them to examine the underlying political, social, and economic foundations of the larger white supremacist capitalist society.

Critical Pedagogy and the Social Construction of Knowledge

Critical educational theorists view school knowledge as historically and socially rooted and interest bound. Knowledge acquired in school—or anywhere, for that matter—is never neutral or objective but is ordered and structured in particular ways; its emphases and exclusions partake of a silent logic. Knowledge is a *social construction* deeply rooted in a nexus of power relations. When critical theorists claim that knowledge is socially constructed, they mean that it is the product of agreement or consent between individuals who live out particular social relations (e.g., of class, race, and gender) and who live in particular junctures in time. To claim that knowledge is socially constructed usually means that the world we live in is constructed symbolically by the mind through social interaction with others and is heavily dependent on culture, context, custom, and historical specificity. There is no ideal, autonomous, pristine, or aboriginal world to which our social constructions necessarily correspond; there is always a referential field in which symbols are situated. And this particular referential field (e.g., language, culture, place, time) will influence how symbols generate meaning. There is no pure subjective insight. We do not stand *before* the social world; we live *in the midst* of it. As we seek the meaning of events we seek the meaning of the social. We can now raise certain questions with respect to the social construction of knowledge, such as: Why do women and minorities often view social issues differently than white males? Why are teachers more likely to value the opinions of a middle-class white male student, for instance, than those of a middle-class black female?

Critical pedagogy asks how and why knowledge gets constructed the way it does, and how and why some constructions of reality are legitimated and celebrated by the dominant culture while others clearly are not. Critical pedagogy asks how our everyday commonsense understandings—our social constructions or “subjectivities”—get produced and lived out. In other words, what are the *social functions* of knowledge? The crucial factor here is that some forms of knowledge have more power and legitimacy than others. For instance, in many schools in the United States, science and math curricula are favored over the liberal arts. This can be explained by the link between the needs of big business to compete in world markets and the imperatives of the new reform movement to bring “excellence” back to the schools. Certain types of knowledge legitimate certain gender, class, and racial interests. Whose interests does this knowledge serve? Who gets excluded as a result? Who is marginalized?

Let’s put this in the form of further questions: What is the relationship between social class and knowledge taught in school? Why do we value scientific knowledge over informal knowledge? Why do we have teachers using “standard English”? Why is the public still unlikely to vote for a woman or an African-American or a Latinola for president? How does school knowledge reinforce stereotypes about women, minorities, and disadvantaged peoples? What accounts for some knowledge having high

status (as in the great works of philosophers or scientists) while the practical knowledge of ordinary people or marginalized or subjugated groups is often discredited and devalued? Why do we learn about the “great men” in history and spend less time learning about the contributions of women and minorities and the struggles of people in lower economic classes? Why don’t we learn more about the American labor movement? How and why are certain types of knowledge used to reinforce dominant ideologies, which in turn serve to mask unjust power relations among certain groups in society?

Forms of Knowledge

Critical pedagogy follows a distinction regarding forms of knowledge posited by the German social theorist Jürgen Habermas.⁵ Let’s examine this concept in the context of classroom teaching. Mainstream educators who work primarily within liberal and conservative educational ideologies emphasize *technical knowledge* (similar to Giroux’s *productive knowledge*): Knowledge is that which can be measured and quantified. Technical knowledge is based on the natural sciences, uses hypothetico-deductive or empirical analytical methods, and is evaluated by, among other things, intelligence quotients, reading scores, and SAT results, all of which are used by educators to sort, regulate, and control students.

A second type, *practical knowledge*, aims to enlighten individuals so they can shape their daily actions in the world. Practical knowledge is generally acquired through *describing and analyzing social situations historically or developmentally*, and is geared toward helping individuals understand social events that are ongoing and situational. The liberal educational researcher who undertakes field-work in a school in order to evaluate student behavior and interaction acquires practical knowledge, for instance. This type of knowledge is not usually generated numerically or by submitting data to some kind of statistical instrument.

The critical educator, however, will be interested in what Habermas calls *emancipatory knowledge* (similar to Giroux’s *directive knowledge*), which attempts to reconcile and transcend the opposition between technical and practical knowledge. Emancipatory knowledge helps us understand how social relationships are distorted and manipulated by relations of power and privilege. It also aims at creating the conditions under which irrationality, domination, and oppression can be overcome and transformed through deliberative, collective action. It has the potential to contribute to social justice, equality, and empowerment. Only in the name of the general rights of society can any knowledge claim to be emancipatory. Only if such knowledge abolishes bourgeois civil society can it lay claim to serve the working class. Knowledge that does not go beyond contemplating the world and observing it objectively without transcending given social conditions merely affirms what already exists. Revolutionary critical knowledge combines theory and practice and contributes to the transformation of existing social relations in the interest of emancipation from the rule of capital.

Class

Class refers to the *economic, social, and political relationships that govern life in a given social order*. Class relationships reflect the constraints and limitations individuals and groups experience in the areas of income level, occupation, place of residence, and other indicators of status and social rank. Relations of class are those associated with surplus labor, who produces it, and who is a recipient of it. Surplus labor is that labor undertaken by workers beyond that which is necessary. Class relations also deal with the social distribution of power and its structural allocation. Today there are greater distinctions within the working classes and it is now possible to talk about the new *underclasses* within the American social structure consisting of black, Hispanic, and Asian class fractions, together with the white aged, the unemployed and underemployed, large sections of women, the handicapped, and other marginalized economic groups. However, it is perhaps more illuminating to identify two main groupings both within the U.S. economy and the global economy: the transnational capitalist class and the working class. Marx argued that the means by which people determine their material world essentially determines how they, themselves, will be produced. Marx also revealed how in capitalist societies, the ruling class extracts a “surplus value” from wage laborers that they employ. On a larger scale, this leads to the exploitation of one class (the working class or class of producers) by the ruling class (the class of appropriators) who extract from the producers a surplus value beyond what is necessary for the productive class to survive. It is precisely this “surplus value” that enables the ruling class to exist. Under capitalist relations of production, capitalists purchase the labor power of the worker in exchange for a wage in order to create value that accrues to capital on behalf of the capitalist. In other words, the capitalist purchases from the worker a commodity that has “use value”: the labor power of the worker. Labor power (the capacity to labor) is always of greater value than its own exchange value because it produces profits from capitalists. The wage appears on the surface to be equivalent to the use value (labor power) it purchases from the workers. Surplus labor is unpaid labor and serves as the basis of capitalist profit. The greater the unpaid labor of the workers, the more profit for the capitalists. The law of value states that the value of a commodity can be found in the labor time socially necessary for its production. According to Marx, class struggle leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat. The revolution to come will occur under the banner of class struggle.

To approach the concept of class from a dialectical Marxist conception stipulates a grasp of Marx’s philosophy of internal relations. As adumbrated in the work of Paula Allman, Glenn Rikowski, and other Marxist educationalists, the philosophy of internal relations underscores the importance of relational thinking. Relational thinking is distinct from categorical thinking. Whereas the former examines entities in interaction with each other, the latter looks at phenomena in isolation from each other. Relational thinking can refer both to external relations or internal relations. Marx was interested in internal relations. External relations are those that produce a synthesis of various phenomena or entities that can exist outside of or independent of this relation. Internal relations are those in which opposite entities are historically mediated such that they do not obtain independent results. In fact, once the internal relationship ceases to exist, the results of their interaction also cease to exist.

A dialectical concept of class examines the internal relations between labor and capital in terms of their dialectical contradictions. A dialectical contradiction is an internal relation consisting of opposites in interaction that would not be able to exist in the absence of their internal relationship to each other. When this internal relationship is abolished, so are the entities. All dialectical contradictions are internal relations. However, not all internal relations are dialectical contradictions. Dialectical contradictions, or the "unity of opposites," are those phenomena that could not exist, continue to exist, or have come into existence in the absence of their internal relation to one another. The very nature (external and internal) of each of the opposites is shaped within its relation to the other opposite. The antagonistic relation between labor and capital or the relation between production and circulation and exchange, constitute the essence of capitalism. Workers' labor is utilized within the capital-labor relation. Workers then constitute the dialectical opposite of capital and enter into a value creation process. The basis of the rift or split within capitalist labor is the relation internal to labor: labor as a value producer and labor as a labor-power developer. One of the oppositions always benefits from the antagonistic internal relationship between capital and labor. Capital (the positive relation) structurally benefits from its relation to labor (the negative relation). To free itself from its subordinate position, labor must abolish this internal relation through the negation of the negation.

To understand class society in this way offers a more profound analytical lens than operationalizing notions of class that reduce it to skill, occupational status, social inequality, or stratification. This is because what is at stake in understanding class as a dynamic and dialectical social relation is undressing the forces that generate social inequality. This can only be accomplished by analyzing the value form of labor within the entire social universe of capital, including the way that capital has commodified our very subjectivities. This mandates that we grasp the complex dialectics of the generation of the capital-labor relation that produces all value.

The capital-labor contradiction constitutes the key dialectical contradiction that produces the historically specific form of capitalist wealth or the value form of capitalist wealth. It is important to remember that the worker does not sell to the capitalist the living active labor which she performs during the hours of her work, but rather sells her labor-power or her capacity to work for a certain number of hours per week. In exchanging her labor-power for wages, the worker receives in return not wages but what Marx called *wage goods*. That is, the worker gets what is determined in amount by what is required for her maintenance and her reproduction as a worker. Thus, she gets no general or abstract form of power over commodities in exchanging her labor-power for a wage. She only gets power over those particular commodities which are needed for her maintenance and for the reproduction of other workers. It is the capitalist who has the power to consume the labor-power which he has bought. Labor-power purchases for the worker only exchanges with values. Labor, as distinct from labor-power, is the exercise of labor-power and it is labor that produces value. The worker is paid for the availability of her labor-power even before commodities have been produced. A certain proportion of the values produced by the worker by means of her labor are over and above the value that she has received as equivalent to the availability of her labor power. When the capitalist consumes what he has paid for, he

therefore receives a higher value than that which is represented in the wages paid out to the worker. The capitalist receives a surplus value created by the worker's labor. The wages the worker receives are therefore not the equivalent of her labor or of her value-producing activity.

It is important to realize that the money equivalent of labor-power is not the same as the money equivalent of labor. The surplus value extracted by the capitalist is actually the unpaid labor of the worker. Labor-power *exchanges with* value whereas labor *produces* value. The capitalist exchanges wages for the worker's labor-power (her power and skills) for a certain number of hours per week. Because the capitalist owns the worker's labor-power, he can sell that labor-power as a commodity for a money-equivalent of the value of that labor-power. The worker's labor-power does not create value but the worker's labor does. Labor-power (the potential to labor), when it is exercised concretely by the worker in the very concrete act of laboring, is what creates capital or value—a relation of exploitation. Concrete labor exercised by the worker constitutes value produced over and above what she gets paid for her labor-power. The worker thus creates the very relation that exploits her. What appears to be an equal exchange—the social transaction of wages for work done as equivalents—is actually a relation of exploitation. It is a relation between persons reduced to a relation between things. The labor/wage relationship as one of equal exchange is only equal from the perspective of its relationship to the market. But what appears to be the exchange of equivalents is actually an exploitative extraction of surplus value by the capitalist. What we are dealing with here, in other words, is the fetishized appearance of a relation of equality. The value produced by labor is “fetishistically” represented equivalently by wages. The dialectical contradiction or internal relation inheres in the fact that the capitalist mode of production of wealth premised on an exchange of equivalents is, in essence, a relation of exploitation through the extraction of surplus value on the part of the capitalist. There is no way to approach the analysis of class within the social universe of capital without addressing the central relation of class struggle that permeates all of social life within capitalist societies.

Culture

The concept of *culture*, varied though it may be, is essential to any understanding of critical pedagogy. I use the term *culture* here to signify *the particular ways in which a social group lives out and makes sense of its “given” circumstances and conditions of life*. In addition to defining culture as *a set of practices, ideologies, and values from which different groups draw to make sense of the world*, we need to recognize how cultural questions help us understand who has power and how it is reproduced and manifested in the social relations that link schooling to the wider social order. The ability of individuals to express their culture is related to the power which certain groups are able to wield in the social order. The expression of values and beliefs by individuals who share certain historical experiences is determined by their collective power in society.⁶

The link between culture and power has been extensively analyzed in critical social theory over the past fifteen years. It is therefore possible to offer three insights from that literature which particularly illuminate the political logic that underlies various cultural/power relations. First, culture is intimately connected with the

structure of social relations within class, gender, and age formations that produce forms of oppression and dependency. Second, culture is analyzed not simply as a way of life, but as a form of production through which different groups in either their dominant or subordinate social relations define and realize their aspirations through unequal relations of power. Third, culture is viewed as a field of struggle in which the production, legitimation, and circulation of particular forms of knowledge and experience are central areas of conflict linked to class struggle. What is important here is that each of these insights raises fundamental questions about the ways in which inequalities are maintained and challenged in the spheres of school culture and the wider capitalist society.⁷

Dominant Culture, Subordinate Culture, and Subculture

Three central categories related to the concept of culture—dominant culture, subordinate culture, subculture—have been much discussed in recent critical scholarship. Culture can be readily broken down into “dominant” and “subordinate” parent cultures. *Dominant culture* refers to social practices and representations that *affirm the central values, interests, and concerns of the social class in control of the material and symbolic wealth of society*. Groups who live out social relations in subordination to the dominant culture of the ruling class are part of the *subordinate culture*. Group *subcultures* may be described as subsets of the two parent cultures (dominant and subordinate). Individuals who form subcultures often use distinct symbols and social practices to help foster an identity outside that of the dominant culture. As an example, we need only refer to punk subculture, with its distinct musical tastes, fetishistic costumery, spiked hair, and its attempt to disconfirm the dominant rules of propriety fostered by the mainstream media, schools, religions, and culture industry. For the most part, working-class subcultures exist in a subordinate structural position in society, and many of their members engage in oppositional acts against dominant ruling-class interests and social practices. It is important to remember, however, that people don’t inhabit cultures or social classes but *live out class or cultural relations*, some of which may be dominant and some of which may be subordinate.⁸

Subcultures are involved in contesting the cultural “space” or openings in the dominant culture. The dominant culture is never able to secure total control over subordinate cultural groups. Whether we choose to examine British subcultural groups (i.e., working-class youth, teddy boys, skinheads, punks, rude boys, Rastafarians) or American groups (i.e., motorcycle clubs such as Hell’s Angels, ethnic street gangs, or middle-class suburban gangs), subcultures are more often *negotiated* than truly *oppositional*. As John Muncie points out, this is because they operate primarily in the arena of leisure that is exceedingly vulnerable to commercial and ideological incorporation.⁹ Subcultures do offer a symbolic critique of the social order and are frequently organized around relations of class, gender, style, and race. Despite the often ferocious exploitation of the subcultural resistance of various youth subcultures by bourgeois institutions (school, workplace, justice system, consumer industries), subcultures are usually able to keep alive the struggle over how meanings are produced, defined, and legitimated; consequently, they do represent various degrees of struggle

against lived subjugation. Many subcultural movements reflect a crisis within dominant society, rather than a unified mobilization against it. They defang the symbolic potency of the ruling class catechism found in the dominant corporate media apparatuses and the cultural institutions controlled by conglomerate ownership and economies of grand scale. For instance, the hippie movement in the 1960s represented, in part, an exercise of petit bourgeois socialism by middle-class radicals who were nurtured both by idealist principles and by a search for spiritual and lifestyle comfort. This often served to draw critical attention away from the structural inequalities of capitalist society. As Muncie argues, subcultures constitute "a crisis within dominant culture rather than a conspiracy against dominant culture."¹⁰ The youth counterculture of the sixties served as the ideological loam that fertilized my pedagogy in Part Two. I had learned the rudiments of a middle-class radicalism and coffee shop outlawry that was preoccupied with the politics of expressive life and avoided examining in a minded and a critical manner the structural inequalities within the integuments of global capitalist society.

Cultural Forms

Cultural forms are those symbols and social practices that express culture, such as those found in music, dress, food, religion, dance, and education, which have developed from the efforts of groups to shape their lives out of their surrounding material and political environment. Television, video, and films are regarded as cultural forms. Schooling is also a cultural form. Baseball is a cultural form. Cultural forms don't exist apart from sets of structural underpinnings which are related to the means of economic production, the mobilization of desire, the construction of social values, asymmetries of power/knowledge, configurations of ideologies, and relations of class, race, and gender.

Hegemony

The dominant culture is able to exercise domination over subordinate classes or groups through a process known as hegemony.¹¹ Hegemony refers to the maintenance of domination not by the sheer exercise of force *but primarily through consensual social practices, social forms, and social structures produced in specific sites such as the church, the state, the school, the mass media, the political system, and the family*. By *social practices*, I refer to what people say and do. Of course, social practices may be accomplished through words, gestures, personally appropriated signs and rituals, or a combination of these. *Social forms* refer to the principles that provide and give legitimacy to specific social practices. For example, the state legislature is one social form that gives legitimacy to the social practice of teaching. The term *social structures* can be defined as those constraints that limit individual life and appear to be beyond the individual's control, having their sources in the power relations that govern society. We can, therefore, talk about the "class structure" or the "economic structure" of our society. Social structures are themselves shaped by the social forces and social relations of production and the dialectical contradiction between labor and capital.

Hegemony is a struggle in which the powerful win the consent of those who are oppressed, with the oppressed unknowingly participating in their own oppression. Hegemony was at work in my own practices as an elementary school teacher. Because I did not teach my students to question the prevailing values, attitudes, and social practices of the dominant society in a sustained critical manner, my classroom preserved the hegemony of the dominant culture. Such hegemony was contested when the students began to question my authority by resisting and disrupting my lessons. The dominant class secures hegemony—the consent of the dominated—by supplying the symbols, representations, and practices of social life in such a way that the basis of social authority and the unequal relations of power and privilege remain hidden. By perpetrating the myth of individual achievement and entrepreneurship in the media, the schools, the church, and the family, for instance, dominant culture ensures that subordinated groups who fail at school or who don't make it into the world of the "rich and famous" will view such failure in terms of personal inadequacy or the "luck of the draw." The oppressed blame themselves for school failure—a failure that can certainly be additionally attributed to the structuring effects of the economy and the class-based division of labor.¹²

Hegemony is a cultural encasement of meanings, a prison-house of language and ideas, that is "freely" entered into by both dominators and dominated. As Todd Gitlin puts it,

Both rulers and ruled derive psychological and material rewards in the course of confirming and reconfirming their inequality. The hegemonic sense of the world seeps into popular "common sense" and gets reproduced there; it may even appear to be generated *by* that common sense.¹³

Hegemony refers to the moral and intellectual leadership of a dominant class over a subordinate class achieved not through coercion (i.e., threat of imprisonment or torture) or the willful construction of rules and regulations (as in a dictatorship or fascist regime), but rather through the general winning of consent of the subordinate class to the authority of the dominant class. The dominant class need not impose force for the manufacture of hegemony since the subordinate class actively subscribes to many of the values and objectives of the dominant class without being aware of the source of those values or the interests which inform them.

Hegemony is not a process of active domination as much as an ethical, political, and economic active structuring of the culture and experiences of the subordinate class by the dominant class. The dominant culture is able to "frame" the ways in which subordinate groups live and respond to their own cultural system and lived experiences; in other words, the dominant culture is able to manufacture dreams and desires for both dominant and subordinate groups by supplying "terms of reference" (i.e., images, visions, stories, ideals) against which all individuals are expected to live their lives. The dominant culture tries to "fix" the meaning of signs, symbols, and representations to provide a "common" worldview, disguising relations of power and privilege through the organs of mass media and state apparatus such as schools, government institutions, and state bureaucracies. Individuals are provided with "subject

positions," which condition them to react to ideas and opinions in prescribed ways. For instance, most individuals in the United States, when addressed as "Americans," are generally positioned as subjects by the dominant discourse. To be an "American" carries a certain set of ideological baggage. Americans generally think of themselves as lovers of freedom, defenders of individual rights, guardians of world peace, etc.; rarely do Americans see themselves as contradictory social agents. They rarely view their country as lagging behind other industrial economies in the world in providing security for its citizens in such areas as health care, family allowance, and housing subsidy programs. As citizens of the wealthiest country in the world, Americans generally do not question why their government cannot afford to be more generous to its citizens. Most Americans would be aghast at hearing a description of their country as a "terrorist regime" exercising covert acts of war against Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq. The prevailing image of America that the schools, the entertainment industry, and government agencies have promulgated is a benevolent one in which the interests of the dominant classes supposedly represent the interests of all groups. It is an image in which the values and beliefs of the dominant class appear so correct that to reject them would be unnatural, a violation of common sense.

Within the hegemonic process, established meanings are often laundered of contradiction, contestation, and ambiguity. Resistance does occur, however, most often in the domain of popular culture. In this case, popular culture becomes an arena of negotiation in which dominant, subordinate, and oppositional groups affirm and struggle over cultural representations and meanings. The dominant culture is rarely successful on all counts. People *do* resist. Alternative groups do manage to find different values and meanings to regulate their lives. Oppositional groups do attempt to challenge the prevailing culture's mode of structuring and codifying representations and meanings. Prevailing social practices are, in fact, resisted. Schools and other social and cultural sites are rarely in the thrall of the hegemonic process since there we will also find struggle and confrontation. This is why schools can be characterized as terrains of transactions, exchange, and struggle between subordinate groups and the dominant ideology. There is a relative autonomy within school sites that allows for forms of resistance to emerge and to break the cohesiveness of hegemony. Teachers battle over what books to use, over what disciplinary practices to use, and over the aims and objectives of particular courses and programs.

One current example of the battle for hegemony can be seen in the challenge by Christian fundamentalists to public schooling. Fundamentalist critics have instigated a debate over dominant pedagogical practices that ranges all the way from textbooks to how, in science classes, teachers may account for the origins of humankind. The important point to remember, however, is that hegemony is always in operation; certain ideas, values, and social practices generally prevail over others.

Not all prevailing values are oppressive. Critical educators, too, would like to secure hegemony for their own ideas. The challenge for teachers is to recognize and attempt to transform those undemocratic and oppressive features of hegemonic control that often structure everyday classroom existence in ways not readily apparent. These oppressive features are rarely challenged since the dominant ideology is so all inclusive that individuals are taught to view it as natural, commonsensical, and invio-

lable. For instance, subordinate groups who subscribe to an ideology that could be described as right wing are often the very groups hurt most by the twelve years of Republican government they elected. Yet the Republican party has been able to market itself as no-nonsense, get-tough, anti-Communist, and hyper-patriotic—features that have always appealed to subordinate groups whose cultural practices may include watching Fox-TV news, following the televangelist programs and crusades, or cheering the pugilistic exploits of the Terminator. Those who seek to chart out the ways in which the wealthy supporters of the capitalist class and transnational capitalist elite are favored over subordinate working-class groups are dismissed as wimpish liberals. Who needs to use force when ideational hegemony works this well? As Gore Vidal has observed about the United States: “The genius of our system is that ordinary people go out and vote against their interests. The way our ruling class keeps out of sight is one of the greatest stunts in the political history of any country.”¹⁴

Ideology

Hegemony could not do its work without the support of ideology. Ideology permeates all of social life and does not simply refer to the political ideologies of communism, socialism, anarchism, rationalism, or existentialism. Ideology refers to *the production and representation of ideas, values, and beliefs and the manner in which they are expressed and lived out by both individuals and groups*.¹⁵ Simply put, ideology refers to the production of sense and meaning. It can be described as a way of viewing the world, a complex of ideas, various types of social practices, rituals, and representations *that we tend to accept as natural and as common sense*. It is the result of the intersection of meaning and power in the social world. Customs, rituals, beliefs, and values often produce within individuals distorted conceptions of their place in the sociocultural order and thereby serve to reconcile them to that place and to disguise the inequitable relations of power and privilege; this is sometimes referred to as “ideological hegemony.”

Stuart Hall and James Donald define ideology as “the frameworks of thought which are used in society to explain, figure out, make sense of or give meaning to the social and political world. . . . Without these frameworks, we could not make sense of the world at all. But with them, our perceptions are inevitably structured in a particular direction by the very concepts we are using.”¹⁶ Ideology includes both positive and negative functions at any given moment: The *positive function* of ideology is to “provide the concepts, categories, images, and ideas by means of which people make sense of their social and political world, form projects, come to a certain consciousness of their place in the world, and act in it”; the *negative function* of ideology “refers to the fact that all such perspectives are inevitably selective. Thus a perspective positively organizes the ‘facts of the case’ in *this* and makes sense because it inevitably excludes *that* way of putting things.”¹⁷

In order to fully understand the negative function of ideology, the concept must be linked to a theory of domination. *Domination* occurs when relations of power established at the institutional level are systematically asymmetrical; that is, when they are unequal, therefore privileging some groups over others. According to John Thompson, ideology as a negative function works through four different modes: le-

gitimation, dissimulation, fragmentation, and reification. *Legitimation* occurs when a system of domination is sustained by being represented as legitimate or as eminently just and worthy of respect. For instance, by legitimizing the school system as just and meritocratic, as giving everyone the same opportunity for success, the dominant culture hides the truth of the hidden curriculum—the fact that those whom schooling helps most are those who come from the most affluent families. *Dissimulation* results when relations of domination are concealed, denied, or obscured in various ways. For instance, the practice of institutionalized tracking in schools purports to help better meet the needs of groups of students with varying academic ability. However, describing tracking in this way helps to cloak its socially reproductive function: that of sorting students according to their social class location. *Fragmentation* occurs when relations of domination are sustained by the production of meanings in a way which fragments groups so that they are placed in opposition to one another. For instance, when conservative educational critics explain the declining standards in American education as a result of trying to accommodate low-income minority students, this sometimes results in a backlash against immigrant students by other subordinate groups. This “divide and rule” tactic prevents oppressed groups from working together to secure collectively their rights. *Reification* occurs when transitory historical states of affairs are presented as permanent, natural, and commonsensical—as if they exist outside of time.¹⁸ This has occurred to a certain extent with the current call for a national curriculum based on acquiring information about the “great books” so as to have a greater access to the dominant culture. These works are revered as high-status knowledge since purportedly the force of history has heralded them as such and placed them on book lists in respected cultural institutions such as universities. Here literacy becomes a weapon that can be used against those groups who are “culturally illiterate,” whose social class, race, or gender renders their own experiences and stories as too unimportant to be worthy of investigation. That is, as a pedagogical tool, a stress on the great books often deflects attention away from the personal experiences of students and the political nature of everyday life. Teaching the great books is also a way of inculcating certain values and sets of behaviors in social groups, thereby solidifying the existing social hierarchy. The most difficult task in analyzing these negative functions of ideology is to unmask those ideological properties which insinuate themselves within reality as their fundamental components. Ideological functions which barricade themselves within the realm of common sense often manage to disguise the grounds of their operations. What is crucially important here is that domination not be left as a free-floating concept linked to the diffuse nature of power. Domination needs to be linked to the process of capitalist exploitation and the extraction of surplus-value and the reproduction of capitalist social relations of production.

At this point it should be clear that ideology represents a vocabulary of standardization and a grammar of design sanctioned and sustained by particular social practices. All ideas and systems of thought organize a rendition of reality according to their own metaphors, narratives, and rhetoric. There is no “deep structure,” totalizing logic, or grand theory pristine in form and innocent in effects which is altogether uncontaminated by the production of value through the dialectical contradiction between capital and labor, by the mediative effects of ideas, or by the way culture is

shaped by social relations of production—in short, by *ideology*. There is no privileged sanctuary separate from culture and politics where we can be free to distinguish truth from opinion, fact from value, or image from interpretation. There is no “objective” environment that is not stamped with social presence or troubled by the insinuation of the forces of production.

If we all can agree that as individuals, we inherit a preexisting sign community, and acknowledge that all ideas, values, and meanings have social roots and perform social functions, then understanding ideology becomes a matter of investigating *which* concepts, values, and meanings *obscure* our understanding of the social world and our place within the networks of power/knowledge relations, and which concepts, values, and meanings *clarify* such an understanding. In other words, why do certain ideological formations cause us to misrecognize our complicity in establishing or maintaining the dialectical contradiction between capital and labor that constitutively privileges capital over labor, and provides ballast to the value form of labor.

The *dominant ideology* refers to patterns of beliefs and values shared by the majority of individuals who have been persuaded not to remove the mystical veil draped over everyday life processes within capitalism. The majority of Americans—rich and poor alike—share the belief that capitalism is a better system than democratic socialism, for instance, or that men are generally more capable of holding positions of authority than women, or that women should be more passive and housebound. Here, we must recognize that the economic system requires the ideology of consumer capitalism to naturalize it, rendering it commonsensical. The ideology of patriarchy also is necessary to keep the nature of the economy safe and secured within the prevailing hegemony. We have been “fed” these dominant ideologies for decades through the mass media, the schools, and family socialization.

Oppositional ideologies do exist, however, which attempt to challenge the dominant ideologies and shatter existing stereotypes. On some occasions, the dominant culture is able to manipulate alternative and oppositional ideologies in such a way that hegemony can be more effectively secured. For instance, “The Cosby Show” on commercial television carries a message that a social avenue now exists in America for blacks to be successful doctors and lawyers. This positive view of blacks, however, masks the fact that most blacks in the United States exist in a subordinate position to the dominant white culture with respect to power and privilege. The dominant culture secures hegemony by transmitting and legitimating ideologies like that in “The Cosby Show,” which reflect and shape popular resistance to stereotypes, but which in reality do little to challenge the real basis of power of the ruling dominant groups.

The dominant ideology often encourages oppositional ideologies and tolerates those that challenge their own rationale, since by absorbing these contradictory values, they are more often than not able to domesticate the conflicting and contradictory values. This is because the hegemonic hold of the social system is so strong, it can generally withstand dissension and actually come to neutralize it by permitting token opposition. During my teaching days in the suburban ghetto, school dances in the gym often celebrated the values, meanings, and pleasure of life on the street—some of which could be considered oppositional—but were tolerated by the administration because they helped defuse tension in the school. They afforded the students

some symbolic space for a limited amount of time; yet they redressed nothing concrete in terms of the lived subordination of the students and their families on a day-to-day basis.

The main question for teachers attempting to become aware of the ideologies that inform their own teaching is: How have certain pedagogical practices become so habitual or natural in school settings that teachers accept them as normal, unproblematic, and expected? How often, for instance, do teachers question school practices such as tracking, ability grouping, competitive grading, teacher-centered pedagogical approaches, and the use of rewards and punishments as control devices? The point here is to understand that these practices are not carved in stone, but are, in reality, socially constructed within material conditions that function to serve capital's drive to augment value and to reproduce abstract labor and the unjust distribution of use-values. How, then, is the distilled wisdom of traditional educational theorizing ideologically structured? What constitutes the origins and legitimacy of the pedagogical practices within this tradition? To what extent do such pedagogical practices serve to empower the student, and to what extent do they work as forms of social control that support, stabilize, and legitimate the role of the teacher as a moral gatekeeper of the state? What are the functions and effects of the systematic imposition of ideological perspectives on classroom teaching practices?

In my classroom journal, what characterized the ideological basis of my own teaching practices? How did "being schooled" both enable and contain the subjectivities of the students? I am using the word *subjectivity* here to mean forms of knowledge that are both conscious and unconscious and which express our identity as human agents. Subjectivity relates to everyday knowledge in its socially constructed and historically produced forms. Following this, we can ask: How do the dominant ideological practices of teachers help to structure the subjectivities of students? What are the possible consequences of this, for good and for ill? Can education be more than the social production of labor-power in ways that reproduce the capitalist form of class society? Is education an aerosol term that hides class exploitation in the mist of its ideological rhetoric?

Prejudice

Prejudice is the negative prejudgment of individuals and groups on the basis of unrecognized, unsound, and inadequate evidence. Because these negative attitudes occur so frequently, they take on a commonsense or ideological character that is often used to justify acts of discrimination.

Critical Pedagogy and the Power/Knowledge Relation

Critical pedagogy is fundamentally concerned with understanding the relationship between power and knowledge. The dominant curriculum separates knowledge from

the issue of power and treats it in an unabashedly technical manner; knowledge is seen in overwhelmingly instrumental terms as something to be mastered. That knowledge is always an ideological construction linked to particular interests and social relations generally receives little consideration in education programs.

The work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault is crucial in understanding the socially constructed nature of truth and its inscription in knowledge/power relations. Foucault's concept of "power/knowledge" extends the notion of power beyond its conventional use by philosophers and social theorists who, like American John Dewey, have understood power as "the sum of conditions available for bringing the desirable end into existence."¹⁹ For Foucault, power comes from everywhere, from above and from below; it is "always already there" and is inextricably implicated in the micro-relations of domination and resistance. Foucault's work on power is limited in that he does not link power sufficiently to the production of value within global capitalist social relations.

Discourse

Power relations are inscribed in what Foucault refers to as *discourse* or a family of concepts. Discourses are made up of discursive practices that Foucault describes as

a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function.²⁰

Discursive practices, then, *refer to the rules by which discourses are formed, rules that govern what can be said and what must remain unsaid, and who can speak with authority and who must listen.* Social and political institutions, such as schools and penal institutions, are governed by discursive practices.

Discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behavior, in forms of transmission and diffusion, and pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them.²¹

For education, discourse can be defined as a "regulated system of statements" that establish differences between fields and theories of teacher education; it is "not simply words but is embodied in the practice of institutions, patterns of behavior, and in forms of pedagogy."²²

From this perspective, we can consider *dominant* discourses (those produced by the dominant culture) as "regimes of truth," as general economies of power/knowledge, or as multiple forms of constraint. In a classroom setting, dominant educational discourses determine what books we may use, what classroom approaches we should employ (mastery learning, Socratic method, etc.), and what values and beliefs we should transmit to our students.

For instance, neoconservative discourses on language in the classroom would view working-class speech as undersocialized or deprived. Liberal discourse would

view such speech as merely different. Similarly, to be culturally literate within a conservative discourse is to acquire basic information on American culture (dates of battles, passages of the Constitution, etc.). Conservative discourse focuses mostly on the works of "great men." A liberal discourse on cultural literacy includes knowledge generated from the perspective of women and minorities. A *critical* discourse focuses on the interests and assumptions that inform the generation of knowledge itself. A critical discourse is also self-critical and deconstructs dominant discourses the moment they are ready to achieve hegemony. A critical discourse can, for instance, explain how high-status knowledge (the great works of the Western world) can be used to teach concepts that reinforce the status quo. Discourses and discursive practices influence how we live our lives as conscious thinking subjects. They shape our subjectivities (our ways of understanding in relation to the world) because it is only in language and through discourse that social reality can be given meaning. Not all discourses are given the same weight, as some will account for and justify the appropriateness of the status quo and others will provide a context for resisting social and institutional practices.²³

This follows our earlier discussion that knowledge (truth) is socially constructed, culturally mediated, and historically situated. Cleo Cherryholmes asserts that dominant discourses determine what counts as true, important, and relevant. Discourses are what gets spoken and are generated and governed by rules and power.²⁴ Truth cannot be spoken in the absence of power relations, and each relation necessarily speaks its own truth. Foucault removes truth from the realm of the absolute; truth is understood only as changes in the determination of what can count as true.

Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.²⁵

In Foucault's view, truth (educational truth, scientific truth, religious truth, legal truth, or whatever) must not be understood as a set of "discovered laws" that exist outside power/knowledge relations and which somehow correspond with the "real." We cannot "know" truth except through its "effects." Truth is not *relative* (in the sense of "truths" proclaimed by various individuals and societies are all equal in their effects) but is *relational* (statements considered "true" are dependent upon history, cultural context, and relations of power operative in a given society, discipline, institution, etc.). The crucial question here is that if truth is *relational* and not *absolute*, what criteria can we use to guide our actions in the world? Critical educators argue that *praxis* (informed actions) must be guided by *phronesis* (the disposition to act truly and rightly). This means, in critical terms, that actions and knowledge must be directed at eliminating pain, oppression, and inequality, and at promoting justice and freedom.

Lawrence Grossberg speaks to the critical perspective on truth and theory when he argues:

The truth of a theory can only be defined by its ability to intervene into, to give us a different and perhaps better ability to come to grips with, the relations that constitute its context. If neither history nor texts speak its own truth, truth has to be won; and it is, consequently, inseparable from relations of power.²⁶

An understanding of the power/knowledge relationship raises important issues regarding what kinds of theories educators should work with and what knowledge they can provide in order to empower students. *Empowerment* means not only helping students to understand and engage the world around them, but also enabling them to exercise the kind of courage needed to change the social order where necessary. Teachers need to recognize that *power relations correspond to forms of school knowledge that distort understanding and produce what is commonly accepted as "truth."* Critical educators argue that knowledge should be analyzed on the basis of whether it is oppressive and exploitative, and not on the basis of whether it is "true." For example, what kind of knowledge do we construct about women and minority groups in school texts? Do the texts we use in class promote stereotypical views that reinforce racist, sexist, and patriarchal attitudes? How do we treat the knowledge that working-class students bring to class discussions and schoolwork? Do we unwittingly devalue such knowledge and thereby disconfirm the voices of these students?

Knowledge should be examined not only for the ways in which it might misrepresent or mediate social reality, but also for the ways in which it actually reflects the daily struggle of people's lives with a capitalist society riven by class antagonism. We must understand that knowledge not only distorts reality, but also provides grounds for understanding the actual conditions that inform everyday life. Teachers, then, should examine knowledge both for the way it misrepresents or marginalizes particular views of the world and for the way it provides a deeper understanding of how the student's world is actually constructed within existing capitalist relations of production. Knowledge acquired in classrooms should help students participate in vital issues that affect their experience on a daily level rather than simply enshrine the values of business pragmatism and the rule of capital. School knowledge should have a more emancipatory goal than churning out workers (human capital) and helping schools become the citadel of corporate ideology.²⁷ School knowledge should help create the conditions productive for student self-determination in the larger society that can only be achieved when class society is abolished and a community of freely associated procedures is created.

Critical Pedagogy and the Curriculum

From the perspective of critical educational theorists, the curriculum represents much more than a program of study, a classroom text, or a course syllabus. Rather, it represents the *introduction to a particular form of life; it serves in part to prepare students for*

*dominant or subordinate positions in the existing capitalist society.*²⁸ The curriculum favors certain forms of knowledge over others and affirms the dreams, desires, and values of select groups of students over other groups, often discriminatorily on the basis of race, class, and gender. In general, critical educational theorists are concerned with how descriptions, discussions, and representations in textbooks, curriculum materials, course content, and social relations embodied in classroom practices benefit dominant groups and exclude subordinate ones. In this regard, they often refer to the *hidden curriculum*.

The Hidden Curriculum

The *hidden curriculum* refers to *the unintended outcomes of the schooling process*. Critical educators recognize that schools shape students both through standardized learning situations, and through other agendas, including rules of conduct, classroom organization, and the informal pedagogical procedures used by teachers with specific groups of students.²⁹ The hidden curriculum also includes teaching and learning styles that are emphasized in the classroom, the messages that get transmitted to the student by the total physical and instructional environment, governance structures, teacher expectations, and grading procedures.

The hidden curriculum deals with the tacit ways in which knowledge and behavior get constructed, outside the usual course materials and formally scheduled lessons. It is a part of the bureaucratic and managerial “press” of the school—the combined forces by which students are induced to comply with dominant ideologies and social practices related to authority, behavior, and morality. Does the principal expel school offenders or just verbally upbraid them? Is the ethos of the office inviting or hostile? Do the administration and teachers show respect for each other and for the students on a regular basis? Answers to these questions help define the hidden curriculum, which refers, then, to the *non-subject-related* sets of behaviors produced in students.

Often, the hidden curriculum displaces the professed educational ideals and goals of the classroom teacher or school. We know, for example, that teachers unconsciously give more intellectual attention, praise, and academic help to boys than to girls. A study reported in *Psychology Today* suggests that stereotypes of garrulous and gossipy women are so strong that when groups of administrators and teachers are shown films of classroom discussion and asked who is talking more, the teachers overwhelmingly choose the girls. In reality, however, the boys in the film outtalk the girls at a ratio of three to one. The same study also suggests that teachers behave differently depending on whether boys or girls respond during classroom discussions. When boys call out comments without raising their hands, for instance, teachers generally accept their answers; girls, however, are reprimanded for the same behavior. The hidden message is “Boys should be academically aggressive while girls should remain composed and passive.” In addition, teachers are twice as likely to give male students detailed instructions on how to do things for themselves; with female students, however, teachers are more likely to do the task for them instead. Not surprisingly, the boys are being taught independence and the girls dependency.³⁰

Classroom sexism as a function of the hidden curriculum results in the unwitting and unintended granting of power and privilege to men over women and accounts for many of the following outcomes:

- Although girls start school ahead of boys in reading and basic computation, by the time they graduate from high school, boys have higher SAT scores in both areas.
- By high school, some girls are less committed to careers, although their grades and achievement-test scores may be as good as boys. Many girls' interests turn to marriage or stereotypically female jobs. Some women may feel that men disapprove of women using their intelligence.
- Girls are less likely to take math and science courses and to participate in special or gifted programs in these subjects, even if they have a talent for them. They are also more likely to believe that they are incapable of pursuing math and science in college and to avoid the subjects.
- Girls are more likely to attribute failure to internal factors, such as ability, rather than to external factors, such as luck.

The sexist communication game is played at work, as well as at school. As reported in numerous studies, it goes like this:

- Men speak more often and frequently interrupt women.
- Listeners recall more from male speakers than from female speakers, even when both use a similar speaking style and cover identical content.
- Women participate less actively in conversation. They do more smiling and gazing; they're more often the passive bystanders in professional and social conversations among peers.
- Women often transform declarative statements into tentative comments. This is accomplished by using qualifiers ("kind of" or "I guess") and by adding tag questions ("This is a good movie, isn't it?"). These tentative patterns weaken impact and signal a lack of power and influence.³¹

Of course, most teachers try hard not to be sexist. The hidden curriculum continues to operate, however, despite what the overt curriculum prescribes. The hidden curriculum can be effectively compared to what Australian educator Doug White calls the *multinational curriculum*. For White,

The multinational curriculum is the curriculum of disembodied universals, of the mind as an information-processing machine, of concepts and skills without moral and social judgment but with enormous manipulative power. That curriculum proposed the elevation of abstract skills over particular content, of universal cognitive principles over the actual conditions of life.³²

White reminds us that no curriculum, policy, or program is ideologically or politically innocent, and that the concept of the curriculum is inextricably related to issues of social class, culture, gender, and power. This is, of course, not the way

curriculum is traditionally understood and discussed in teacher education. The hidden curriculum, then, refers to learning outcomes not openly acknowledged to learners, because to do so would undermine the social universe in which capitalist schooling thrives in its reproduction of labor-power for the transnational capitalist class. But we must remember that not all values, attitudes, or patterns of behavior that are by-products of the hidden curriculum in educational settings are necessarily bad. The point is to identify the structural and political assumptions upon which the hidden curriculum rests and to attempt to change the institutional arrangements of the classroom so as to offset the most undemocratic and oppressive outcomes and therefore begin to de-capitalize our individual and collective social existences and the value form of labor that supports them and gives them their potency.

Curriculum as a Form of Cultural Politics

Critical educational theorists view curriculum as a form of *cultural politics*, that is, as a part of the sociocultural dimension of the schooling process. The term cultural politics permits the educational theorist to highlight the political consequences of interaction between teachers and students who come from dominant and subordinate cultures. To view the curriculum as a form of cultural politics *assumes that the social, cultural political and economic dimensions are the primary categories for understanding contemporary schooling*.³³

School life is understood not as a unitary, monolithic, and ironclad system of rules and regulations, but as a cultural terrain characterized by varying degrees of accommodation, contestation, and resistance. Furthermore, school life is understood as a plurality of conflicting languages and struggles, a place where classroom and street-corner cultures collide and where teachers, students, and school administrators often differ as to how school experiences and practices are to be defined and understood.

This curriculum perspective creates conditions for the student's self-empowerment as an active political and moral subject. I am using the term *empowerment* to refer to the process through which students learn to critically appropriate knowledge existing outside their immediate experience in order to broaden their understanding of themselves, the world, and the possibilities for transforming the taken-for-granted assumptions about the way we live. Stanley Aronowitz has described one aspect of empowerment as "the process of appreciating and loving oneself";³⁴ empowerment is gained from knowledge and social relations that dignify one's own history, language, and cultural traditions. But empowerment means more than self-confirmation. It also refers to the process by which students learn to question and selectively appropriate those aspects of the dominant culture that will provide them with the basis for defining and transforming, rather than merely serving, the wider social order.

Basing a curriculum on cultural politics consists of linking critical social theory to a set of stipulated practices through which teachers can dismantle and critically examine dominant educational and cultural traditions in the context of wider social relations of production within the larger capitalist social order. Many of these traditions have fallen prey to both a technocratic and *instrumental rationality* (a way of looking at the world in which "ends" are subordinated to questions of "means" and in which

“facts” are separated from questions of “value”) that either limits or ignores democratic ideals and principles. Critical theorists want particularly to develop a language of critique and demystification that can be used to analyze those latent interests and ideologies that work to socialize students in a manner compatible with the dominant culture. Of equal concern, however, is the creation of alternative teaching practices capable of empowering students both inside and outside of schools.

Social Reproduction: A Critical Perspective

Over the decades, critical educational theorists have tried to fathom how schools are implicated in the process of *social reproduction*. In other words, they have attempted to explore how schools *perpetuate or reproduce the social relationships and attitudes needed to sustain the existing dominant economic and class relations of the larger society*.³⁵ Social reproduction refers to the intergenerational reproduction of social class (i.e., working-class students become working-class adults; middle-class students become middle-class adults). Schools reproduce the structures of social life through the colonization (socialization) of student subjectivities and by establishing social practices characteristic of the wider capitalist society.

Critical educators ask: How do schools help transmit the status and class positions of the wider society? The answers, of course, vary enormously. Some of the major mechanisms of social reproduction include the allocation of students into private versus public schools, the socioeconomic composition of school communities, and the placement of students into curriculum tracks within schools.³⁶ A group of social reproduction theorists, known as *correspondence theorists* have attempted to show how schools reflect wider social inequalities. In a famous study by Bowles and Gintis,³⁷ the authors argue in deterministic terms that there is a *relatively simple correspondence between schooling, class, family, and social inequalities*. Bowles and Gintis maintain that children of parents with upper-socioeconomic standing most often achieve upper-socioeconomic status while children of lower-socioeconomic parents acquire a correspondingly lower-socioeconomic standing. However, schooling structures are not always successful in ensuring privilege for the students' advantaged class positions. The correspondence theorists *could not explain why some children cross over from the status of their parents*. Social reproduction, as it turns out, is more than simply a case of economic and class position; it also involves social, cultural, and linguistic factors.

This brings into the debate the *conflict or resistance theorists*, such as Henry Giroux and Paul Willis, who pay significantly more attention to the *partial autonomy* of the school culture and to the role of conflict and contradiction within the reproductive process itself.³⁸ *Theories of resistance* generally draw upon an understanding of the complexities of culture to define the relationship between schools and the dominant society. Resistance theorists challenge the school's ostensible role as a democratic institution that functions to improve the social position of all students—including, if not especially, those groups that are subordinated to the system. Resistance theorists question the processes by which the school system reflects and sustains

the logic of capital as well as dominant social practices and structures that are found in a class-, race-, and gender-divided society.

One of the major contributions to resistance theory has been the discovery by British researcher Paul Willis that working-class students who engage in classroom episodes of resistance often implicate themselves even further in their own domination.³⁹ Willis's group of working-class schoolboys, known as "the lads," resisted the class-based oppression of the school by rejecting mental labor in favor of more "masculine" manual labor (which reflected the shop floor culture of their family members). In so doing, they ironically displaced the school's potential to help them escape the shop floor once they graduated. Willis's work presents a considerable advance in understanding social and cultural reproduction in the context of student resistance. Social reproduction certainly exceeds mobility for each class, and we know that a substantial amount of class mobility is unlikely in most school settings. The work of the resistance theorists has helped us understand how domination works, even though students continually reject the ideology that is helping to oppress them. Sometimes this resistance only helps secure to an even greater degree the eventual fate of these students.

How, then, can we characterize student resistance? Students resist instruction for many reasons. As Giroux reminds us, not all acts of student misbehavior are acts of resistance. In fact, such "resistance" may simply be repressive moments (sexist, racist) inscribed by the dominant culture.⁴⁰ I have argued that the major drama of resistance in schools is an effort on the part of students to bring their street-corner culture into the classroom. Students reject the culture of classroom learning because, for the most part, it is delibidinalized (eros-denying) and is infused with a cultural capital to which subordinate groups have little legitimate access. Resistance to school instruction represents a resolve on the part of students not to be dissimulated in the face of oppression; it is a fight against the erasure of their street-corner identities. To resist means to fight against the monitoring of passion and desire. It is, furthermore, a struggle against the capitalist symbolization of the flesh. By this I mean that students resist turning themselves into worker commodities in which their potential is evaluated only as future members of the labor force. At the same time, however, the images of success manufactured by the dominant culture seem out of reach for most of them.

Students resist the "dead time" of school, where interpersonal relationships are reduced to the imperatives of market ideology. Resistance, in other words, is a rejection of their reformulation as docile objects where spontaneity is replaced by efficiency and productivity, in compliance with the needs of the corporate marketplace. Accordingly, students' very bodies become sites of struggle, and resistance a way of gaining power, celebrating pleasure, and fighting oppression in the lived historicity of the moment.

What, then, are the "regimes of truth" that organize school time, subject matter, pedagogical practice, school values, and personal truth? How does the culture of the school organize the body and monitor passion through its elaborate system of surveillance? How are forms of social control inscripted into the flesh? How are students' subjectivities and social identities produced discursively by institutionalized power, and how is this institutional power at the same time produced by the legitimization of discourses that treat students as if they were merely repositories of lust

and passion (the degenerative animal instincts)? How is reason privileged over passion so that it can be used to quell the “crude mob mentality” of students? What is the range of identities available within a system of education designed to produce, regulate, and distribute character, govern gesture, dictate values, and police desire? To what extent does an adherence to the norms of the school mean that students will have to give up the dignity and status maintained through psychosocial adaptations to life on the street? To what extent does compliance with the rituals and norms of school mean that students have to forfeit their identity as members of an ethnic group? How have identities been formed as reservoirs of labor-power within the crucible of capitalism, within the social universe of capitalism? How can a critical education help implode these identities in a struggle against capitalist life formations and the internal relations that link being human to capitalist social relations? These are all questions that theorists within the critical tradition have attempted to answer. And the answers are as various as they are important.

Some versions of student resistance are undoubtedly romantic: The teachers are villains, and the students are antiheroes. I am not interested in teacher-bashing, nor in resurrecting the resistant student as the new James Dean or Marlon Brando. I much prefer the image of Giroux’s resisting intellectual, someone who questions prevailing norms and established regimes of truth in the manner of a Rosa Luxemburg or a Jean-Paul Sartre.⁴¹

I would like to stress an important point. Our culture in general (and that includes schools, the media, and our social institutions) has helped educate students to acquire a veritable passion for ignorance. We have effectively debarred knowledge from critique. The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan suggests that ignorance is not a passive state but rather an active excluding from consciousness. The passion for ignorance that has infected our culture demands a complex explanation, but part of it can be attributed, as Lacan suggests, to a *refusal to acknowledge that our subjectivities have been constructed out of the information and social practices that surround us*.⁴² Ignorance, as part of the very structure of knowledge, can teach us something. But we lack the critical constructs with which to recover that knowledge *which we choose not to know*. Unable to find meaningful knowledge “out there” in the world of prepackaged commodities, students resort to random violence or an intellectual purple haze where anything more challenging than the late night news is met with retreat or despair; and of course, it is the dominant culture that benefits most from this epidemic of conceptual anesthesia. The fewer critical intellectuals around to challenge its ideals, the better.

What do all these theories of resistance mean for the classroom teacher? Do we disregard resistance? Do we try to ignore it? Do we always take the student’s side?

The answers to these questions are not easy. But let me sketch out the bare bones of a possible answer. First of all, schooling should be a process of understanding how subjectivities are produced. It should be a process of examining how we have been constructed out of the prevailing ideas, values, and worldviews of the dominant culture. The point to remember is that if we have been made, then we can be “un-made” and “made over.” What are some alternative models with which we can begin to repattern ourselves and our social order? Teachers need to encourage students to be self-reflexive about these questions and to provide students with a conceptual

framework to begin to answer them. Teaching and learning should be a process of *inquiry*, of critique; it should also be a process of *constructing*, of building a social imagination that works within a language of hope. If teaching is cast in the form of what Henry Giroux refers to as a “language of possibility,” then a greater potential exists for making learning relevant, critical, and transformative. Knowledge is relevant only when it begins with the experiences students bring with them from the surrounding culture; it is critical only when these experiences are shown to sometimes be problematic (i.e., racist, sexist); and it is transformative only when students begin to use the knowledge to help empower others, including individuals in the surrounding community. Knowledge then becomes linked to social reform. An understanding of the language of the self can help us better negotiate with the world. It can also help us begin to forge the basis of *social transformation*: the building of a better world, the altering of the very ground upon which we live and work. Understanding our lived experiences is important but must be accompanied by class struggles that can reshape the social relations in which experiences are produced. This means overcoming alienated labor by challenging the very nature of capitalist social relations: in short, through a struggle for a socialist alternative to capitalism.

Teachers can do no better than to create agendas of possibility in their classrooms. Not every student will want to take part, but many will. Teachers may have personal problems—and so may students—that will limit the range of classroom discourses. Some teachers may simply be unwilling to function as critical educators. Critical pedagogy does not guarantee that resistance will not take place. But it does provide teachers with the foundations for understanding resistance, so that whatever pedagogy is developed can be sensitive to sociocultural conditions that construct resistance, lessening the chance that students will be blamed as the sole, originating source of resistance. No emancipatory pedagogy will ever be built out of theories of behavior which view students as lazy, defiant, lacking in ambition, or genetically inferior. A much more penetrating solution is to try to understand the structures of mediation in the sociocultural world that form student resistance. In other words, what is the larger picture? We must remove the concept of student resistance from the preserve of the behaviorist or the depth psychologist and insert it instead into the terrain of social theory.

Cultural Capital

Resistance theorists focus on *cultural reproduction* as a function of class-based differences in *cultural capital*. The concept of *cultural capital*, made popular by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, refers to the general cultural background, knowledge, disposition, and skills that are passed on from one generation to another. Cultural capital represents *ways of talking, acting, and socializing, as well as language practices, values, and styles of dress and behavior*. Cultural capital can exist in the embodied state, as long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, as cultural artifacts such as pictures, books, diplomas, and other material objects; and in the institutionalized state, which confers original properties on the cultural capital that it guarantees. For instance, to many teachers, the cultural traits exhibited by students—e.g., tardiness, sincerity, honesty, thrift, industriousness, politeness, or a certain way

of dressing, speaking, and gesturing—appear as natural qualities emerging from an individual's "inner essence." However, such traits are to a great extent culturally inscribed and are often linked to the social class standing of individuals who exhibit them. Social capital refers to the collectively owned economic and cultural capital of a group.⁴³ Taking linguistic competency as just one example of cultural capital, theorists such as Basil Bernstein contend that class membership and family socialization generate distinctive speech patterns. Working-class students learn "restricted" linguistic codes while middle-class children use "elaborated" codes. This means that the speech of working-class and middle-class children is generated by underlying regulative principles that govern their choice and combination of words and sentence structures. These, according to Bernstein, have been learned primarily in the course of family socialization.⁴⁴ Critical theorists argue that schools generally affirm and reward students who exhibit the elaborately coded "middle-class" speech while disconfirming and devaluing students who use restricted "working-class" coded speech.

Students from the dominant culture inherit substantially different cultural capital than do economically disadvantaged students, and schools generally value and reward those who exhibit that dominant cultural capital (which is also usually exhibited by the teacher). Schools systematically *devalue* the cultural capital of students who occupy subordinate class positions. Cultural capital is reflective of material capital and replaces it as a form of symbolic currency that enters into the exchange system of the school. Cultural capital is therefore symbolic of the social structure's economic force and becomes in itself a productive force in the reproduction of social relations under capitalism. Academic performance represents, therefore, not individual competence or the lack of ability on the part of disadvantaged students but *the school's depreciation of their cultural capital*. The end result is that the school's academic credentials remain indissolubly linked to an unjust system of trading in cultural capital that is eventually transformed into *economic* capital, as working-class students become less likely to get high-paying jobs.

When I worked with students in my suburban inner-city classroom, those whose cultural capital most closely resembled my own were the students with whom I initially felt most comfortable, spent the most instructional time, and most often encouraged to work in an independent manner. I could relate more readily and positively—at least at the beginning—to those students whose manners, values, and competencies resembled my own. Teachers—including myself—easily spotted Buddy, T. J., and Duke as members of the economically disadvantaged under class, and this often worked against them, especially with teachers who registered such students as intellectually or socially deficient. Intellectual and social deficiencies had little, if anything, to do with their behavior. Class-specific character traits and social practices did.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. If teachers unwittingly participate in what critical educational theorists call social reproduction, what would you as a teacher do to overcome the worst dimensions of this process?

2. As teachers or prospective teachers, what can we do to make the hidden curriculum less hidden and less harmful? Is this really possible in a capitalist society grounded in class antagonisms?
3. If teaching and learning are forms of cultural politics, what are the ways in which we unconsciously silence or exclude different student voices in our classrooms, such as the voices of minority and economically disadvantaged students? How do we speak in the name of emancipation without showing scorn for those who are caught in the grip of domination or ignorance, regardless of their class positions? Discuss using examples from Part Two's classroom journal.
4. How does our approach to curriculum help shape student attitudes and perceptions about the nature of the world? Is the world made problematic? Is it open to questioning and analysis? Do you see the social structure as unchanging and inviolable or as open to new possibilities for emancipatory change? How can we develop an education discourse that integrates the language of power and purpose with the language of intimacy, friendship, and caring?
5. Should teachers attempt to change a student's cultural capital to be more like the teacher's? How can teachers give legitimacy to the cultural capital of disadvantaged or minority students? Should they still provide them with an opportunity to "act middle class" for the purposes of strengthening their chances for job placement? Can you relate these issues to your own teaching experiences or experiences as a student?
6. Should teachers be answerable for the larger social consequences of their collective individual acts? Should a consistent failure of teachers to act on the obligations incurred at the social level—i.e., to redress social injustice, racism, and sexism—be legitimate ground for challenging their personal actions in the classroom? What are the moral variants against which we shall construct ourselves as social agents of change?
7. If educational hegemony means the incorporation of students and teachers into relations of consumption and consumerist ethics, what kind of pedagogy can we develop to challenge the ability of the dominant ideas of the capitalist class to win our consent in these matters?
8. How would you evaluate my role as a beginning teacher? What would you have done differently if you were in my place, and why?

This last question raises the sensitive issue of how well-intentioned teachers willingly or unwillingly create classroom environments that mirror the social division of labor in the capitalist workplace. The implicit messages transmitted by teachers about work, authority, and social rules are essential to the functioning of society and the reproduction of the social division of labor and economic privileges enjoyed by dominant social groups. For instance, can you see how teachers in my school exercised forms of symbolic violence (cultural domination) through their imposition of white, Anglo-Saxon perspectives, thereby devaluing the experiences of minority and disadvantaged students? In what ways did my colleagues and I inculcate the cultural capital (i.e., the linguistic and cultural competencies that one inherits by virtue of the social class into which one is born) of the dominant class and thereby (unconsciously or otherwise) disconfirm and delegitimize the voices of students who did not happen to share our cultural capital? All of this raises yet another issue: that is, in what ways does the moral leadership of teachers and administrators help the dominant class secure hegemony over subordinate groups?

Some readers may be offended at the suggestion that teachers frequently function as unwitting pawns in class and cultural domination and exploitation. Schools, of course, are much more than instruments of the dominant culture in its ideological struggle, its "war of positions," so to speak, against the proletariat. I certainly do not view my role as an elementary school teacher as entirely oppressive. In fact, I believe much good came out of my classroom teaching.

Just as teachers are not total oppressors, it is equally true that students don't sit passively and absorb the culture of the classroom without some resistance. We need to relate such resistance to the symbolic domination characteristic of dominant pedagogical practices and to see student resistance not as a measure of wanton destructiveness (although some resistance is undeniably of this nature) or learned helplessness but as a form of moral and political indignation. Many students resist what the school has to offer, including the subtextual contours of instruction—what we have termed the "hidden curriculum"—in order to survive with a measure of dignity the vagaries of class and cultural servitude. In what ways, then, do schools serve as contradictory sites which both empower students and oppress them? Is this contradiction inevitable, or is it a process that needs to be seriously examined?

There are many more issues to be raised. I have provided the above questions simply as a starting point to help you unravel some of the implications that the critical perspective has to offer for rethinking schooling in the light of transforming society. To raise more questions here would be to undercut the purpose of this book. It remains for *you* to raise other issues, for it is with you, as living agents of history, that the real struggle for human freedom begins. After all, it is your labor-power that is currently being commodified by capital and thus it is in your power to challenge value production through class struggle and to bring about new forms of non-alienated labor.

ENDNOTES

1. The sources for this section are as follows: Bertell Ollman, "The Meaning of Dialectics," *Monthly Review* (1986, November): 42–55; Wilfrid Carr and Stephen Kemmis, *Becoming Critical: Knowing Through Action Research* (Victoria: Deakin University, 1983); Stephen Kemmis and Lindsay Fitzclarence, *Curriculum Theorizing: Beyond Reproduction Theory* (Victoria: Deakin University, 1986); Henry A. Giroux, *Ideology, Culture, and the Process of Schooling* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press and London: Falmer Press, Ltd., 1981); Ernst Bloch, "The Dialectical Method," *Man and World* 16 (1983): 281–313.
2. Carr and Kemmis, *Becoming Critical*, 36–37.
3. McLaren, *Schooling as a Ritual Performance*.
4. This discussion of micro and macro objectives is taken from Henry A. Giroux, "Overcoming Behavioral and Humanistic Objectives," *The Education Forum* (1979, May): 409–419. Also, Henry A. Giroux, *Teachers as Intellectuals: Towards a Critical Pedagogy of Practical Learning* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1988).
5. See Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. J. J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1972); see also Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, trans. J. Viertel. (London: Heinemann, 1974). As cited in Kemmis and Fitzclarence, *Curriculum Theorizing*, 70–72.
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7. Henry A. Giroux and Peter McLaren, "Teacher Education and the Politics of Engagement: The Case for Democratic Schooling," *Harvard Educational Review* 56 (1986): 3, 232-233. Developed from Giroux's previous work.
8. For this discussion of culture, I am indebted to Raymond A. Calluori, "The Kids are Alright: New Wave Subcultural Theory," *Social Text* 4, 3 (1985): 43-53; Mike Brake, *The Sociology of Youth Culture and Youth Subculture* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Graham Murdock, "Mass Communication and the Construction of Meaning," in N. Armstead (Ed.), *Reconstructing Social Psychology* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974); Dick Hebdige, *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (London and New York: Methuen, 1979); Ian Connell, D. J. Ashenden, S. Kessler, and G. W. Dowsett, *Making the Difference: Schooling, Families, and Social Division* (Sydney, Australia: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). Also, Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, *Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain* (London: Hutchinson and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 1980).
9. John Muncie, "Pop Culture, Pop Music, and Post-War Youth Subcultures," *Popular Culture*, Block 5, Units 18 and 19/20, The Open University Press (1981): 31-62.
10. Muncie, "Pop Culture," 76.
11. The section on hegemony draws on the following sources: Giroux, *Ideology, Culture, and the Process of Schooling*, 22-26; *Popular Culture* (1981), a second level course at The Open University, Milton Keynes, England, published by The Open University Press and distributed in the United States by Taylor and Francis (Philadelphia, PA). Several booklets in this series were instrumental in developing the sections on ideology and hegemony: Geoffrey Bourne, "Meaning, Image, and Ideology," *Form and Meaning* 1, The Open University Press, Block 4, Units 13 and 15, 37-65; see also Tony Bennett, "Popular Culture: Defining Our Terms," *Popular Culture: Themes and Issues I*, Block 1, Units 1 and 2, 77-87; Tony Bennett, "Popular Culture: History and Theory," *Popular Culture: Themes and Issues II*, Block 1, Unit 3, 29-32. Another important source is a booklet for a third level course at The Open University: *The Politics of Cultural Production*, The Open University Press, 1981. Relevant sections include: Geoff Whitty, "Ideology, Politics, and Curriculum," 7-52; David Davies, "Popular Culture, Class, and Schooling," 53-108. See also P. J. Hills, *A Dictionary of Education* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 166-167; and Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (London: Fontana, 1983), 144-146.
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15. For this section on ideology, I am indebted to Henry A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education: Pedagogy for the Opposition* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1983), 143. See also Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux, *Education Under Siege* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1985); Douglas Kellner, "Ideology, Marxism, and Advanced Capitalism," *Socialist Review* 8, 6 (1978): 38; Gibson Winter, *Liberating Creation: Foundations of Religious Social Ethics* (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 97. See also: Geoff Whitty, "Ideology, Politics, and Curriculum," 7-52, and David Davies, "Popular Culture, Class, and Schooling," 53-108; Williams, *Keywords*, 153-157; Tony Bennett, "Popular Culture: Defining Our Terms," 77-87; and Geoffrey Bourne, "Meaning, Image, and Ideology," 37-53.
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17. Donald and Hall, *Politics and Ideology*, x.
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20. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1972), 117.
21. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 200.
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23. See Chris Weedon, *Feminist Practice and Post-Structuralist Theory* (Oxford: Basil-Blackwell, 1987).
24. Cleo Cherryholmes, *Power and Criticism: Post-Structural Investigations in Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988).
25. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 131.
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38. See, for instance, Peter McLaren, "The Ritual Dimensions of Resistance: Clowning and Symbolic Inversion," *Boston University Journal of Education* 167, 2 (1985): 84–97, and Giroux, *Theory and Resistance*.
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